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Ireland and Brexit: A Roundtable
editors’ note: On June 23, 2016, voters in the United Kingdom stunned the world 
by voting to leave the European Union, which it had joined in 1973. Governments, 
businesses, and individuals worldwide are still grappling with the question of what 
the long- and short-term consequences of the unprecedented decision may prove to 
be. Ireland, given its geographical proximity (the only nation to share a land border 
with the UK), and its extensive trade relationship with the United Kingdom—not 
to mention a centuries-long history of complex Anglo-Irish relations—almost cer-
tainly will feel the results of the Brexit vote more than any other member state. 
Recognizing the uncertainty and volatility of the Brexit fallout, New Hibernia 
Review nonetheless felt it important to convene a discussion on this event—if only 
to provide a snapshot of early responses to the historic decision, the ramifications 
of which are still unfolding. Below, a panel of three political scientists and two his-
torians offer their impressions, comments, and speculations in what Brexit may 
mean for Ireland. The panel conducted their conversation by e-mail in autumn of 
this year.
new hibernia review: Let’s start with a very general question, perhaps one that 
those of you resident abroad might be better suited to answer. What is the general 
attitude toward the European Union in Ireland? Obviously, something (or many 
things) so disconcerted a majority in Britain that they voted to leave the EU. But 
one hears nothing at all about “Irexit” sentiment. What’s different in Ireland? 
mary c. murphy: In the UK and elsewhere, opposition to the EU is filtered 
through strong Euroskeptic movements and political parties. In Ireland, the 
Eurosceptic movement is relatively weak, and tends to be confined to smaller 
parties and some Independent TDs. Three of the four largest parties are pro-
EU—Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party. Sinn Féin is far more critical 
of the EU, and has traditionally campaigned against EU treaty revisions in the 
Republic. In 2016, however, the party campaigned in Northern Ireland  for the 
UK to remain in the EU.
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It is also important to note that, despite strong levels of support for the EU, 
the Irish electorate have on occasion voiced concerns about aspects of the Euro-
pean integration process. Twice, the Irish have rejected proposed treaty revisions 
(the Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008), only to over-
turn those decisions during a second referendum once specific guarantees were 
 received. 
Attitudes to the European Union in the Republic have historically been posi-
tive, and Irish satisfaction levels tend to be higher than the EU average. The latest 
Eurobarometer poll reveals that 58 percent of Irish respondents have a positive 
image of the EU, the highest satisfaction rate for any EU member state.1 The 
same report shows that the Irish are also the most optimistic about the future 
of the EU. A full 77 percent of Irish respondents, compared with an EU average 
of 50 percent, are hopeful about the EU’s future. It is worth noting, however, 
that this survey was conducted in May 2016 prior to the UK referendum and in 
advance of the EU’s Apple tax ruling against Ireland. 
For the most part, Ireland’s largely positive relationship with the EU can 
be explained by the fact that Ireland has traditionally fared well as a member. 
The single European market provides Ireland with secure access to the largest 
trading bloc in the world. Levels of inward investment have been positively 
impacted by membership of the EU bloc. Irish trade has diversified since ac-
cession to the EU in 1973, to the point where dependence on the UK market 
has lessened, although the UK-Ireland trading relationship remains highly 
important. Ireland also benefited directly from EU structural fund support, 
which has been instrumental in improving Irish infrastructure and also com-
petitiveness. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has also helped to 
modernize the Irish agri-food sector and effectively underpins Ireland’s agri 
industry. Other features of the EU which have been positive for Ireland include 
a progressive environmental policy, gender equality legislation, the Erasmus+ 
program (which allows young people to study in other European higher edu-
cation institutions, and vice versa), and support for research funding through 
Horizon 2020. 
In terms of Ireland’s relationship with the UK, this has evolved during the 
period of EU membership and some suggest it has been positively impacted by 
joint UK and Irish membership of the EU. Today, the relationship is defined by 
friendship. There are close political links between the two member states, and 
each state has been a strong ally for the other in the EU context. 
Recent developments—including Brexit, but also the EU’s Apple tax  ruling—
present challenges for Ireland’s relationship with the EU. However, the option of 
an Irish exit from the EU, does not currently enjoy any credibility as a serious 
1. Standard Eurobarometer 85, July 2016, 16.
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response to these developments. A recent debate in Dáil Éireann demon strated 
that support for Ireland to leave the EU was all but nonexistent. A very small 
minority of Independent TDs supported an Irish departure from the EU. All of 
the main parties, however, regretted the UK’s decision to leave, and voiced their 
commitment to Ireland remaining in the EU.2
Ireland’s current situation is certainly precarious and Brexit poses some seri-
ous risks for the Irish state and its economic well-being. The Irish government 
is likely to agitate for some special recognition for Ireland in terms of the ar-
rangements reached between the UK and EU during the exit negotiations. This 
approach, rather than a wholesale exit from the EU, is judged to be in Ireland’s 
better interests. The loss of an important trading partner and EU ally is regret-
table, but not to the point where it has seriously advanced the possibility of 
Ireland following the UK out of the EU bloc. The EU is an important backdrop 
against which the Irish state has developed and matured. EU membership has 
brought not just material benefits, but political benefits, too; there is no appetite 
in Ireland to undermine or jeopardize what has, on the whole, been a positive 
and beneficial relationship. 
Perhaps the more likely scenario for Ireland is one where the Irish govern-
ment may support the achievement of Irish unity by consent—a situation which 
would (presumably) allow Northern Ireland to remain in the EU as part of a 
united Ireland. This move would safeguard some economic interests on the is-
land, particularly in relation to free movement across the border. It would also 
respond directly to the 56 percent of the NI electorate who voted to support the 
UK remaining in the EU. The idea of Irish unity in the context of Brexit has 
already been voiced by the taoiseach.3
Ireland and the UK share many interests and common concerns, but it is 
clear that both states differ substantially on the question of EU membership. The 
UK’s departure from the EU is unlikely to predicate a similar Irish exit. 
gillian o’brien: I’m entirely in agreement with Mary Murphy’s comments—
although I do think Irish confidence in the EU has been shaken over the last 
number of years. There are certainly those prepared to offer anti-EU sound bites 
if asked, but there is not any groundswell of opinion actively in favor of Ireland 
following Britain out of the EU.
It’s hard to make direct comparisons between Ireland’s relationship with the 
EU and Britain’s relationship with the EU. Ireland has always been an enthusi-
2. See Statements on the UK Referendum on EU Membership, Dáil Debate, 27 June 2016, http://
oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2016062700018
?opendocument).
3. “Irish unity must be considered in Brexit talks, says Enda Kenny,” Irish Times, 9 September 2016.
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astic member, whereas Britain has never been fully engaged with the EU. This 
certainly has some roots in the history of both countries. There has long been a 
feeling that Britain has never really thrown off the idea that it is a global power 
(and in some respects, it is). Britain to some extent still regards itself as superior 
to many of the other member states—the shadow of the British Empire is a very 
long one.
timothy white: I don’t disagree at all, but it’s also worth remembering that in 
some ways, Irish support for the European project initially was counter- intuitive. 
The Irish were among the most nationalistic groups when they joined the Eu-
ropean Union. They reported a low level of European identity; in this way, they 
were initially similar to the British. 
However, the Irish have been extremely supportive of the EU for practical 
reasons. Initially, they benefited from structural funds that helped build Irish 
infrastructure. The Irish also believed that the Common Agricultural Policy was 
also extremely beneficial to Irish farmers. This was more important in the early 
1970s, when agriculture was a much larger part of the Irish economy than it is 
today. By the early 1980s, the Irish had come to believe that relations with  others 
in Western Europe had improved (this was in marked contrast to the British 
and especially the Northern Irish, who did not believe that their relations with 
others had improved in the post-World War II period). Irish interest in the EU 
remained relatively low in the initial decades of membership as the Irish focused 
more on local and national elections and politics. Thus, by the late 1980s the Irish 
had the most positive view of the CAP of any member state’s population, and the 
Irish had a net positive feeling toward the European Community. However, this 
enthusiasm ranked seventh among the twelve member states (again, a marked 
contrast with the UK, where there was a net negative feeling toward the Euro-
pean Community in the late 1980s). 
o’brien: I also think that in Ireland, people very often regard themselves as Irish 
Europeans. This is certainly not the case in much of Britain, as evidenced by the 
Brexit vote, but also anecdotally. In Ireland, the freedom of movement within the 
Union has been largely beneficial, and perceived as beneficial to the country—
and in a country where emigration has historically been a feature for many, this 
mobility has often been regarded as a positive. In Britain—largely fueled by the 
media—the open borders has been seen as a negative.
At a very basic level, the visibility of EU-funded projects in Ireland has been 
important in terms of public perception of the Union. Wherever there has been 
EU funding there have been enormous billboards proclaiming this—so the di-
rect value of the EU to Ireland is highly visible. In Britain, this funding was also 
provided, but it was never heralded. Huge motorway projects were undertaken 
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(amongst many other things) but no one ever knew that substantial amounts of 
the funding for those roads came from Europe. National and local government, 
commentators, media were all reluctant (for often contradictory reasons) to em-
phasize the positives that come with EU membership—something successive 
Irish governments have been very active in promoting.
In conversation with a friend the other day we were discussing Ireland’s rela-
tionship with the EU and she made the analogy that the Irish were like a rescue 
dog—grateful, but with discipline issues and a little wild streak! In many ways 
that sums it up.
timothy mcmahon: My thoughts on this question are fairly general, but, as a 
historian I cannot help but note that, in many respects, the aforementioned pos-
itive feelings toward the EU echo ideas expressed by early twentieth-century na-
tionalists. I’m thinking of people like W. P. Ryan, the socialist and nationalist, 
who saw the language revival in Ireland as similar to movements occurring on 
the continent and as Ireland reawakening to a more European sensibility than it 
had under the Union. Of course, that concept shouldn’t be overblown, but link-
ing up with the EU institutionalized that connection that had been cemented 
through familial trade networks and also through Catholicism—even when all 
of Ireland was tied to Britain under the crown, or via the Union. Indeed, if part 
of the nationalist project in the twentieth century was to overcome the epithet 
that the Irish were provincial, then having that alternative reference point of 
Europe—as distinct from Britain—mattered a great deal. 
It might also be important to think about another of the important external 
referents, i.e., the US. In the light of the Apple decision this may sound anachro-
nistic, but in addition to the low corporate tax rate, one of the allures for Ameri-
can investors has been that they will have access to the EU through Ireland. That 
hasn’t been lost on the Irish, at all. 
white: On occasion, Irish support for further integration in Europe has, in fact, 
been somewhat hesitant—as the need to have two referenda on two EU trea-
ties indicates. Still, while there has been some fluctuation over the decades in 
terms of levels of support for the EU in Ireland, the Irish have supported their 
membership and participation in the EU primarily for the economic benefit it 
has brought the nation, first in agriculture and more recently, by providing a 
mechanism to attract foreign investment for those seeking to produce and sell in 
the EU. It is doubtful that Ireland’s pharmaceutical and chemical sector, as well 
as the IT sector, would have developed the way it has without Irish membership 
in the EU. Most Irish citizens recognize and appreciate the economic opportuni-
ties that have come with EU membership.
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new hibernia review: What did the vote in the different kingdoms and regions 
tell us about perceptions of the relationship between Britain, Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland and the wider European community?
neal g. jesse: This question reminds me of a map in Chris Clark’s 2012 book 
about the origins of the Great War, The Sleepwalkers. The map depicts Europe 
as it existed in 1914. Across the British Isles stretches a single, bold, fully capi-
talized word: britain. There are no lines across the islands delineating Scot-
land or Wales, no mention of Ireland as a subject nation, there is no complexity 
or diversity; there is only the singular, all-encompassing Britain. And there it 
is, that single word representing a United Kingdom. And that word is placed 
thusly against that of France, the Russian Empire, the Austria- Hungarian Em-
pire, and Prussia, among others. The map portrays a simple fact: the foun-
dation for the single moniker of “Britain” is power derived by a centrally 
governed state. It also establishes Britain as something not quite European— 
a kingdom close to Europe, but somehow different than Europe. And so I would 
like to offer my observations on one part of the larger question about percep-
tions: has the Brexit vote changed external perceptions of Britain, and if it did, 
how might it change those perceptions?
At the start of the twentieth century, British power was not unrivaled, but 
no one would doubt its existence. After all, the sun never set on the British Em-
pire. And to the rest of Europe, this is how they understood the British: as a 
united kingdom and empire. With exceptions such as the failed Jacobite rising 
of 1745 during the War of Austrian Succession, foreign powers—in this instance, 
France—rarely attempted to pit a minority nation against the unified govern-
ment of Great Britain. By 1914, a European observer would certainly not be chas-
tised for considering Britain to be monolithic, cyclopean, and of one mind in the 
projection of its power. That the reality was much more complex was not lost on 
other European powers. The Roger Casement affair with imperial Germany and 
the attempted running of guns to the Irish rebels is a clear example of a foreign 
government exploiting national tensions within Britain. 
Still, the idea of a singular Britain would continue after both world wars. 
Without doing too much injustice to the details of history, one can observe that 
British power, economic and military—and not the power of the individual 
 nations—was the lure of Britain to the European Economic Communities. That 
Britain might have any internal differences was only of passing consideration 
to European actors such as de Gaulle. Acceptance or rejection of the British ap-
plication turned on issues of power: Would British trade diminish French post-
war economic gains? Would British inclusion in a European community bring 
in American influence? Who would control Europe’s destiny, a Franco-German 
rapproachment, or the British? And the reasons to include Britain were as obvi-
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ous: a stronger—and for this you should read more powerful—trade bloc, a 
stronger diplomatic bloc, and a stronger European bloc.
The postwar world enshrined the dominance of the nation-state as the pri-
mary actor in international relations in many ways: trade agreements, inter-
national diplomacy, security alliances, etc. The history of the Cold War is the 
containment of nationalist demands within the Western states and their con-
solidation into the status quo of left-right “catch-all” political parties domi-
nating legislatures. And again, the wider European community could see the 
ever- smoldering independence movement in Scotland or the internal, sectarian 
strife in Northern Ireland. But those were “British” problems for the British state 
to solve. Parallels between these British problems and that of other European 
states could certainly be drawn straight and true, for instance the terrorism of 
the ETA and the IRA, so again the diversity within Britain was always apparent. 
But to answer the motivating question about perceptions, perceiving Britain as 
multi-national did not benefit European or non-European actors as much as 
perceiving Britain as singular. British foreign policy behaved as if the kingdom 
was truly united—so why wouldn’t all external actors find utility in perceiving 
Britain that way? 
With the end of the Cold War, nationalist aspirations rose all around the 
globe. Now, there was space for nationalist demands to be made, and in some 
instances to be heard. Scholarship on this fact is so plentiful that we do not 
need to litigate it here. Of course, Britain was not immune to this global trend. 
Independence demands rose in Scotland and settlement of differences in North-
ern Ireland gained more urgency. In many ways the Good Friday Agreement, as 
well as devolution to Scotland and Wales, reinforced the notion of a single Brit-
ain. Nationalist demands were dealt with in a contemporary and well-respected 
manner that preserved the apparent solidarity of the British state. Britain still 
negotiated agreements as a single, sovereign nation with power at the heart of 
the bargaining (the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 is a prime example). Thus, the 
external perception of the centralized British government being dominant over 
the nations seemed to be reinforced in the 1990s and early 2000s.
white: If I might just jump in, I am not sure I entirely agree with the notion 
that nationalist aspirations rose around the world after the Cold War. From 
the American perspective, the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union so dominated world politics that Americans 
tended to ignore or minimize the reality of ethno-national conflicts. We should 
be careful not to confuse British power in the twentieth century with domestic 
tranquility in the United Kingdom. Nicholas Mansergh’s The Unresolved Ques-
tion (1991) highlighted the fundamental instability of the 1921 treaty and appar-
ent settlement. More recently, Feargal Cochrane makes a similar argument in 
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The Reluctant Peace. My point is that despite the global strength of the UK (es-
pecially in the first half of the twentieth century) the internal logic of the multi-
national state was less stable and secure.
jesse: Thanks, Tim—your point is well taken.
So, are perceptions of the centralized British government different now? I am 
certain that someone more knowledgeable of the survey results can go over the 
differences in how the individual nations voted for “Leave” or “Remain” in great 
detail and ascertain the perceptions of the Scots, Welsh, Irish, etc. What seems of 
interest to me is whether there is utility for external actors to perceive Britain in 
a different way, given the Brexit results. That the heart of the British kingdom—
and by this, I mean the English—voted “Leave” may have surprised observers, 
but it does point to a continued perception of English dominance over the Brit-
ish state. To the degree that it is the British state’s interest, as perceived by the 
English, to leave the EU, Brexit does not unearth any need for a new perception 
of Britain by external actors. After all, had not Thatcher demanded opt-outs 
when it was supported by the British electorate? The perception of Britain as a 
reluctant European is neither new nor inaccurate. Yet, Brexit confirms that the 
reluctance is now more severe than it had been in the past. That might be the 
fulcrum on which perceptions will change over time.
For now, the Brexit vote has revealed how sharp the distinctions really are be-
tween the Scots and the Northern Irish Catholic community versus the English 
and Northern Irish Protestant community over whether the United Kingdom is 
1) a singular state and 2) a European state. The former is being challenged in a 
way that could fundamentally alter British power. The single-state solutions of 
the 1990s have not produced greater unity. Rather, for good or for ill, they have 
allowed nationalist demands to build. The Scottish representation in the Scottish 
parliament and in the commons has never been this great. (Well, maybe “never” 
is the wrong word, as an independent Scottish parliament once existed.) And a 
Catholic-Irish community in Northern Ireland that had slowly grown accus-
tomed since 1998 to the notion that its future would be as a part of the United 
Kingdom seems now to once again be entertaining a refutation of that notion. 
To a European observer, the centripetal forces that kept the Kingdom united are 
now weaker than the centrifugal forces rendering it asunder. Cameron’s desper-
ate gamble on a referendum as a means to appease divisions within the Con-
servative Party was just the opening shot in the war. The rise of UKIP and the 
Brexit vote are the first skirmishes, giving evidence not to a new reality, but to the 
strength of the forces of diversity over the forces of unity.
And what of British power? Is not the British state still powerful? Surely, the 
answer is yes, but something is now different on the European map of today 
versus Clark’s map of 1914. Europe is not just a few empires but rather a mosaic 
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of nation-states and nationalities. The last hundred years has seen the fragmen-
tation of Europe increase as the rigidity of that single, bold, capitalized word 
britain remained. 
white: I certainly agree that the British experience with empire and the com-
monwealth resulted in a focus far beyond Europe, while the continental states 
were more focused on rebuilding after the war. The British eventually joined 
the European project, but long after the core states of the European Community 
had begun the process of integration. There were large numbers of Euroskeptics, 
especially in the Conservative Party in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Brexit vote 
gained support from many beyond the old Euroskeptics. The vote vividly dem-
onstrated diverging attitudes toward European institutions among the different 
groups in the UK. Scotland’s vote strongly in favor of remaining in the EU was 
in stark contrast to the vote in England. The vote in favor of remaining in the 
EU among voters in Northern Ireland also highlighted differences between this 
region and England.
murphy: Thanks to Neal and Tim for their insights, and in particular, for put-
ting the question in historical context. It’s always useful to be reminded and to 
reflect on how British power and perceptions of it have evolved and changed 
over time. 
If I may, I might just further reflect on contemporary Britain, bearing in 
mind that it is a state which has changed substantially over time. The changes 
have touched every facet of British life and have encapsulated political, eco-
nomic, constitutional, social, demographic, and cultural change. This process of 
adjustment has been challenging for a state, and its people, which prided itself 
on its dominant place in the world order. The referendum on EU membership 
provided a space for Britain to reflect on the progression (or is it regression?) 
of the British state. There is only a very limited tradition of referendum use in 
Britain, so this moment provided an opportunity for the English public, in par-
ticular, to vocalize their objections to what they view as one of the reasons for 
British decline—namely, the EU.
It is the English regions where we find the highest levels of political disen-
chantment. It is these parts of the UK which have suffered disproportionately 
as a consequence of the demise of Britain, its empire, economy (specifically its 
industrial sector), and its political dominance. Early research has demonstrated 
that concerns about immigration and the long-term decline in manufacturing 
and other sectors played an important role in deciding the referendum outcome. 
Political forces, including UKIP, were ready and willing to amplify and channel 
the voices of those who have been worst affected by globalization and inward 
migration—and much of this cohort was located in the English regions. These 
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voters linked their disillusionment to the EU, blaming it for negative economic 
and social changes. Their faith in Britain was solid. Many voters were confident 
that if Britain were to “take back control,” the circumstances of English voters 
would be improved. This harks back to an earlier period when British confidence 
was high, the economy was strong, and the British place in the world was more 
assured. 
In contrast, Scotland, London, and Northern Ireland, voted “Remain.”  Voters 
here were motivated by other factors, and politics it seems played a greater role in 
determining the outcome. Scotland is less encumbered by memories of a bygone 
era. Scotland’s devolved institutions have lent some dynamism and vibrancy to 
Scottish politics and have allowed Scottish identity to be expressed in political 
form. Secure in their own identity, Scottish voters are focused on what is best 
for Scotland, and the EU is viewed as being the context within which Scottish 
economic interests can be best achieved. 
Northern Ireland is slightly different. The two communities there have dif-
ferent political aspirations and constitutional preferences, and this is partly 
reflected in the referendum vote. Nationalists overwhelmingly supported “Re-
main,” while Unionists were more reticent. One third of Unionists, it is esti-
mated, voted “Remain.” The vote, however, reflects nationalist support for the 
EU, and their preference to remain in the EU alongside the Republic of Ireland. 
For Unionists, the practical challenges associated with leaving the EU were ap-
parent, but for a majority, loyalty to Britain trumped concerns about the impact 
of Brexit. 
If we view Britain through the Brexit lens, it gives us an up-to-date and accu-
rate picture of how Britain views itself. And the picture it reveals is a fragmented 
one. The differences between the various territories are stark, and increasingly 
so. The idea of “Britain,”as per traditional perceptions of the British Empire, is 
not shared across the UK. Perceptions about the EU are vastly different across 
the various territories. Maybe Britain is shrinking . . . and becoming synonymous 
with England, and England alone.
The failure of the UK central government to frame a narrative during this ep-
isode which is more inclusive and genuinely representative of Britain as a whole 
has been in evidence during the referendum period. Other parts of Britain, those 
outside England, did not feature in the national debate. The debate in North-
ern Ireland had a different tone, content, and focus to that in England/Britain. 
Northern Ireland interests during the exit process appear to be only minimally 
important to England/Britain.
The referendum debate, outcome and exit process suggest that differences 
between territories have become more pronounced and that relationships across 
the UK have been fractured. As the UK “takes back control,” the cohesion of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland may, in fact, be lost.
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o’brien: My take on this is perhaps a little different. It seems to me that, to a 
large extent, the vote (both generally and regionally) doesn’t necessarily reflect 
Britain’s or the various regions’ relationship with Europe. Living in Liverpool, I 
saw the vote as much more insular than that. 
On the ground, I saw very little intellectualization or reflection on Britain’s 
relationship with Europe, either historic, current, or future. In my own region, 
Liverpool bucked the trend among most Northern post-industrial towns and 
cities voting for Brexit, but Liverpool as a former international seaport has a 
long tradition of multi-culturalism and radical politics (not that I think voting 
“Remain” was a radical step at all). Some other urban centers across the North-
west (including Manchester, Leeds, York, and Newcastle) also voted “Remain” 
but huge swathes of the region voted “Leave.” And in many cases the vote was 
very tight—in Leeds, it was 49.7 percent to “Leave” and 50.3 percent to “Remain.”
The issue of immigration was key. Regionally, some of the highest votes to 
leave were in places in eastern England. It’s simplistic to say that areas where the 
“Remain” vote was highest were areas not facing issues relating to immigration, 
or were areas positively associated with multi-culturalism. But it is true that “Re-
main” vote dominated in places like Scotland, Northern Ireland, and London. 
With the exception of Northern Ireland, the only other area with a direct border 
with the EU is Gibraltar, which voted overwhelmingly in favor of “Remain” (96 
percent, if I recall correctly).
Regionally, the contrast between the Europe referendum in 1975 and that of 
2016 is quite interesting. In 1975 the vote to stay in Europe was 67 percent in favor, 
but Scotland was one of the areas which was unenthusiastic about the Common 
Market (something reversed in the recent referendum). I agree with Mary Mur-
phy’s point that the Scottish vote reflects a security in their own identity. The 
simple fact is they are less attached to the notion of the faded glory of Empire 
that is to be found in parts of England.
In terms of the rhetoric being used here, and not just in relation to Brexit, 
there seems a growing sense of there being a very clear division between England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (and possibly taking London as a sepa-
rate entity too). This isn’t new and the devolution of parliaments, the increasing 
power of the London Mayor and the growth in strength of the SNP are certainly 
factors. But broad brushstrokes discussing Britain’s attitude to anything at the 
moment seems foolhardy. The fact that neither “Leave” nor “Remain” seemed 
to have any real regional campaign strategy seemed odd to me, though I think 
it’s safe to say that neither side had a coherent campaign strategy, regional or 
otherwise. What we are seeing now is an extremely fractured Britain with divi-
sions along regional lines but also a myriad of other fault lines appearing. Those 
fault lines have not been created by the discussions relating to Brexit, but have 
certainly been brought to the fore by them. 
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jesse: One way to perceive the Brexit vote is to notice that it signals that Britain 
is more European than it realizes. Britain, the last empire—if not in name or 
global reach but as still an empire in its European geography remaining from the 
map of 1914—is not immune to the forces of fragmentation that have reshaped 
Europe. British power, like that of the Austria-Hungarian Empire or Ottoman 
Empire, must eventually give way to the realities of any united kingdom (lower 
case intentional): that minority nationalities will one day seek to exit the union. 
Britain has been last, but it is not atypical. And that could be the most enduring 
change in perception: Britain may finally be more European than it truly thinks 
that it is . . . or at least, parts of Britain are.
There is, of course, much more complexity to the issue of external per-
ceptions Scottish overtures to the EU were met with equal parts welcome and 
displeasure, as not all European states are ready to embrace the perception of a 
multi-national Britain. The Spanish reaction to the Scottish desire to separate 
membership in the EU fully illustrates the reluctance by some centralized multi-
national states to accept any new reality in the United Kingdom. But it seems 
reasonable to assert that the possibility of a new way of perceiving Britain is 
indeed possible.
new hibernia review: What are the implications for the Brexit vote for British-
Irish relations? What are the biggest unanswered questions that the governments—
particularly the Irish government—will have to sort through once the British invoke 
Article 50? Specifically, how will it affect the largest land border between a Brexit-
Britain and an EU country?
mcmahon: One of the most dismaying elements of the Brexit campaign and 
the subsequent statements about what it means for Irish-British relations is the 
seeming lack of recognition by the “Leave” campaigners and now, the sitting 
government, that there is a border with a sovereign state—but one that has 
been subject to extreme pressures and international agreements already. Just to 
be clear, the Belfast Agreement was not merely signed by the governments of 
the two states: it was ratified in separate concurrent referenda by people in the 
Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. It established island-wide institutions and 
did a great deal to transform border relations. Transforming those relations, 
however, does not mean that the border has been eliminated, even if coopera-
tion north and south has improved. And in a context in which both states, that 
is, the United Kingdom and the Republic, are EU members, those institutions 
have made great sense, but they were and are the result of covenants between 
the two states.
All of that is mere preface to where we are now, yet the signals from the new 
prime minister and her cabinet have been both contradictory and tone-deaf to 
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the history of British-Irish relations. That she would refer to her party as the 
Conservative and Unionist Party as she did shortly after taking office is but one 
example. Even if she meant it to underscore her commitment to retaining Scot-
land within the UK (as seems likely), the resonance of that title in an Irish con-
text is immense, hearkening back to the early twentieth century when Conserva-
tive leaders aided and abetted the arming of Ulster Unionists in contravention 
to constitutional practice. It also is entirely possible that part of the prime min-
ister’s thinking was to assure the leadership of the Democratic Unionist Party in 
Northern Ireland that there would not be any push to see a referendum on Irish 
unification in the near future; although the people of Northern Ireland voted to 
remain within the EU, the DUP had campaigned for “Leave,” and that base likely 
needs reassurance.
More jarring was the statement by the secretary of state for exiting the Eu-
ropean Union, David Davis, on Sky News in July, when he acknowledged that 
“one of our really challenging issues . . . will be the internal border we have 
with southern Ireland.” He may, of course, have been making an off-hand com-
ment—but the point to remember is that in affairs of state, no comment is 
off-hand. “Southern Ireland” was the name originally slated for the twenty-six 
counties in the New Government of Ireland Act of 1920, the law that created 
Northern Ireland but that never took effect in the twenty-six counties because 
the ongoing independence struggle led instead to the creation of the Irish Free 
State, with greater sovereignty than that envisioned by the devolutionist 1920 
Act. Let alone the subsequent developments in the relations between that state 
and its successor republic and the United Kingdom. To use the phrase “south-
ern Ireland” along with the phrase “internal border” suggests that Mr. Davis did 
not recognize a century’s worth of changes in British-Irish relations that, quite 
frankly, are significant at this moment of determining the way forward with the 
border.
A final thought. The Conservative Party conference in September and the 
statements made immediately afterward suggest that the Irish state will need to 
be especially firm when negotiating as an EU state and as a sovereign state over 
maintaining existing covenants. In particular, I am thinking about the PM’s 
comments about taking a firm stand for sovereignty, about Home Secretary 
Amber Rudd’s statement that Britain may require companies to publish the 
proportion of foreign staff in order to shame them into hiring more Britons, 
and about reports that the UK government will not accept advice from non-
British scholars on questions related to the EU. These are disturbing, xeno-
phobic signals, which could prove counterproductive to both Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. To realize how counterproductive such stances are, we should 
ask, “What role should Irish-born or American-born scholars of Britain and 
Ireland play in discussions about border relations?” Those who are working at 
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British universities, even when they have expertise for which they were hired 
by those universities, would have no official voice in shaping what is to come. 
That is simply bad policy, but it is entirely consistent with the messaging we’ve 
heard since July.
white: Based on comments made by different British officials since the referen-
dum, it increasingly seems we are likely to see a “hard” exit of the United King-
dom from the European Union. This would mean that many of the elementary 
forms of cooperation that the EU created may disappear.
Practically speaking, this would put the Irish government in a fundamen-
tally different negotiating position from other members of the EU. The Irish 
government has consistently stated its interest in continuing the cooperation 
that has emerged as part of the European project and in the wake of the Good 
Friday Agreement. Some are interpreting a hard exit from the EU as a real chal-
lenge to the North-South cooperation created by this treaty. While it is easy to 
focus on the physical border which may become less open and porous for both 
those living in the North and the Republic, the physical border is less important 
than the pattern of cooperative relations that have increasingly assisted an often 
begrudging peace process in Northern Ireland. If leaders from all political par-
ties seek to maintain the heretofore achieved cooperation, then Brexit will prove 
to be no more problematic than decommissioning or police reform was in the 
peace process. 
If, however, leaders choose to grandstand a narrow, parochial advantage for 
“their” side in the conflict based on Brexit, then the challenge of implementing 
the UK’s exit will clearly threaten the peace process. Despite the potential short-
term advantage parties might gain from such a strategy, the long-term benefits 
of continuing the peace process weigh heavily on all the parties. There is a great 
incentive and sense of responsibility that restrain parties from using Brexit for 
their narrow political advantage. 
The Irish government and nationalist and republican parties in Northern 
Ireland have an incentive to reach out to the Unionists, especially the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party, who supported leaving the EU. It must be made clear that 
their desire to leave the EU does not in any way minimize the commitment of the 
UK government and the parties in Northern Ireland to all of the elements agreed 
upon in the Good Friday Agreement. Those who live near the border who are 
represented by politicians in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann 
will pressure their leaders to facilitate the beneficial relationship that has devel-
oped because of the peace process. While the EU funds targeted to the North are 
likely to end, hopefully they will continue to enhance economic and community 
development in the border counties in the Republic. Practically speaking, it is 
likely that the Irish and British governments will negotiate a bilateral agreement 
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to make the border as open as possible. This is in the interest of both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
o’brien: What’s interesting is that as each day passes and the British govern-
ment’s plans for Brexit ebb and flow, I vacillate between thinking the hard Brexit 
that is being predicted will be a disaster for Ireland, North and South, and think-
ing that the government appears so divided and rudderless that it will be impos-
sible for them to actually see Brexit through in any fashion (though I suspect 
that’s just wishful thinking on my part).
It does appear that the British government is making it up as it goes along. 
Amber Rudd’s announcement that employers would have to publish lists of their 
foreign staff was withdrawn before I had time to order my shamrock pin with 
a halo of EU stars around it, but it is that sort of statement (among others) that 
makes me think that there is, in fact, no plan, and that the government is busy 
flying kites to gauge reaction. 
In all sorts of ways, the hard Brexit that’s now being discussed will be bad for 
Ireland. The issue of the border is one thing; despite reassurances that it won’t be 
a “hard” border it’s difficult to see how that will be organized. The reappearance 
of a hard border would be a regressive step economically, politically, and psy-
chologically. The financial repercussions for Northern Ireland with either a hard 
or soft Brexit will be significant given the amount of EU money that has been 
pumped into Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement (and even be-
fore, but particularly since 1998).
If Britain does withdraw from the single market—which is now looking 
increasingly likely—this will be problematic for Ireland. It’s hard to see how 
goods being transported across the EU, through Britain, and on to Ireland 
won’t be subjected to price increases given the additional time it will take 
freight to get through additional controls. It’s difficult to see how free move-
ment of goods and people between Britain and Ireland would be maintained. 
There is the possibility of a bilateral arrangement being made but as John 
Fitzgerald pointed out recently in the Irish Times, historically bilateral arrange-
ments between Britain and Ireland have been not been particularly beneficial 
to Ireland.4 If such a bilateral arrangement is to be negotiated it is (as Fitzger-
ald points out) probably better that the negotiations would be carried out by 
the EU on behalf of Ireland.
It may be that some financial services will relocate from London to Dub-
lin. But it seems to me while this might be courted and applauded by the Irish 
government this would be only one small positive among many large negatives.
4. John FitzGerald, “Negotiating table with UK reversed by Brexit,” Irish Times, 12 August 2016. 
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jesse: Will Irish-British relations post-Brexit be a case of plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose? Maybe—but likely not. While it is true that Irish entry 
into the EEC was in tandem with the third British application in 1973, their 
path inside the European Union has differed since that time. With only some 
overstatement and oversimplification, Britain has remained the reluctant 
European and Ireland the enthusiastic European. In a post-Brexit Europe, the 
two will be on opposite sides of an imaginary (or at least let’s hope it’s imaginary) 
fence running across the northeast of the Irish isle. The most tangible part of 
the new divide will be the existence of EU laws and regulations on one side of 
it, and the absence of them on the other. This will create disturbances in many 
areas of the Irish-British relationship that have consequences for Ireland and 
fundamentally continue Ireland on the path of slowly distancing itself from 
the UK.
The first and perhaps most obvious implication is for trade between the 
two countries and its impact on the overall Irish economy. Irish trade with 
Britain is over £30 billion, and while trade between the two countries has been 
diminishing, the decline of the pound versus the euro certainly will hurt Irish 
exports to the United Kingdom. Further, as the British economy slides into a 
likely post-Brexit recession, demand for Irish goods may suffer, adding further 
stress to the Irish economy. As around 40 percent of Irish food exports are to 
the United Kingdom, any loss of demand will hit Irish farmers hard. Lead-
ing economists throughout Europe anticipate both short-term and long-term 
consequences for the Irish economy. As the gigantic British passenger liner 
sinks, it drags down the small Irish fishing boats near it. Thus, while the Irish 
government certainly would like the British to maintain their inclusion in the 
single market, such an inclusion is not necessarily positive for all sectors of the 
Irish economy. The Irish government will have to find ways to accommodate 
the winners and losers of trading with a post-Brexit Britain.
One aspect of trade that is perhaps under-recognized is that Northern Irish 
businesses are much more dependent on trade to the Republic than the other 
way around. Northern Irish firms would consequently want to maintain an open 
access to consumers to the South. Would this economic incentive create more 
demands in the North for the single market to be maintained? Possibly. We could 
easily anticipate that any formal or informal barriers to trade between the UK 
and Ireland would be opposed on both sides of the border, but likely more so to 
the North. Would the position of Northern Irish businesses be at odds with the 
demands of “Leave” voters? Most likely. 
For obvious reasons, the existence, and maintenance, of an open border 
between the North and the South dominates the discussion about Ireland and 
Brexit. Yet, there are other subtle connections including, for example, the free-
dom of travel between the two countries. A common travel area exists, but 
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can such a luxury be taken for granted in the near future? If a greater set of 
controls present themselves on the North-South border, we could imagine the 
added inconvenience to the 23,000 or so who cross the border every day. But 
more than this, wouldn’t the United Kingdom want to control this border so 
that migration from non-EU or EU nations doesn’t get into the UK via the 
“backdoor” of Northern Ireland? The Brexit vote was to some degree an anti-
migration vote, so demands to “control” that border certainly will be made. 
And what of the roughly 100,000 British passport holders in Ireland and the 
400,000 plus Irish citizens in the United Kingdom? Reciprocal rights would 
have to be negotiated.
murphy: In terms of how Brexit will affect the land border between Ireland and 
the UK, here again we are unsure. We first need to know where that border might 
be. There are various options and possibilities (I refer in particular to the work of 
Cathal  McCall at Queens, who has looked at how the UK might be “re-bordered” 
after Brexit). One option may be to maintain a soft border between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic, with a harder border being drawn around the rest of 
the UK. This would mean free movement across the North-South Irish border, 
but then a necessity to show travel documents, etc., when moving from the is-
land of Ireland to the rest of Britain. Of course, this would likely offend Union-
ists in the North, as it would, to some extent, cut Northern Ireland off from the 
rest of the UK. Alternatively, Ireland might ally itself more closely to the UK after 
Brexit and allow the drawing of a hard border around the entire of the isles of 
Ireland and Britain. However, this option would cut Ireland off from the rest 
of the EU and may even problematize long-term Irish membership of the EU. 
The other—less dramatic—option is to instate a (conventional) hard border be-
tween the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. No one of these options 
will appeal to all. There are no ready or easy answers here. 
jesse: There are other, less obvious, connections between the Republic and 
Northern Ireland. As just one example, in 2007 the all-island electricity market 
was established. Once the UK exits the EU, the electricity market in Northern 
Ireland potentially becomes part of the larger Great Britain market, not the sin-
gle European market. Thus, prices will be generated by the British market and 
Irish energy costs will be tied to that market more than to the wider European 
markets. Of course, there is also the potential, albeit small, for tariffs to be im-
posed. Given this implication, the Irish government may need to seek continen-
tal sources of energy to avoid too much dependence on British markets.  And 
what laws and regulations may need to be rewritten without the overarching EU 
legal structure facilitating cooperation between the two nations on matters such 
as electricity? How many small legal details must be addressed? And at what cost 
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in pounds and euros? In this sense, the biggest unanswered question may be how 
best, and at least cost, to deal with all the small questions that will emerge from 
having Ireland in the EU and Britain out of it.
murphy: It truly is extraordinarily challenging to consider future consequences 
and implications. This is particularly difficult given that there is no precedent for 
an EU member state to leave the EU; indeed, the provision for a member state to 
leave has only existed since the Lisbon Treaty was agreed in 2007. 
The absence of a template has meant that a considerable amount of confu-
sion has marked the period immediately after the Brexit vote. There is some 
disarray within the UK about the departure process, its timing, and what the UK 
can hope to achieve during the various negotiations. As for other member states, 
and the EU, there is a lack of clarity there, too, and there are different perspec-
tives about how to engage with the EU following the decision to leave. Some may 
wish to deal harshly with the UK in an attempt to dissuade any other member 
state from following the UK out of the EU. Others may wish to protect relations 
with the UK in order not to destabilize the EU, or valuable bilateral economic 
relationships. 
During the referendum campaign, the strength and depth of British-Irish 
relations was on show as the Irish government supported the UK government’s 
“Remain” position. It also seems likely that Ireland will try to continue to sup-
port the UK during future negotiations with the EU. However, there is some-
thing of a dilemma here for Ireland. As Neal and Gillian have pointed out, avoid-
ing a hard Brexit is manifestly in Ireland’s interests. In Northern Ireland, there 
is a similar cross-party consensus that a hard Brexit would be negative for the 
region. But across the rest of the UK, the situation is less clear. Theresa May ap-
pears to be swaying toward a harder form of Brexit, prioritizing border controls 
rather than access to the single market. This poses problems for Ireland, which 
favors continued UK membership of the single market. 
The question of how Ireland can support a UK position at variance with 
Irish interests poses an intriguing problem for the Irish state. It certainly may 
challenge British-Irish relations, but in my view, it is unlikely to fundamentally 
undermine those relations. Having worked together closely and successfully on 
the Belfast Agreement and subsequent Northern Ireland negotiations, the Brit-
ish and Irish have become adept at achieving compromise and consensus. These 
skills will again be necessary in the weeks, months, and years ahead. There is an 
important difference, however, in that the Brexit context is very different from 
the bilateral and multi-party context which shaped earlier contact between the 
two states. Navigating this uncharted territory may prove to be one of the biggest 
tests facing British-Irish relations in the contemporary period. But I would be 
quietly confident that the relationship will withstand that test. 
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new hibernia review: In the twentieth century, we became accustomed to 
thinking of nation-states as givens. Already the Belfast Agreement had posed a chal-
lenge to this, but Brexit takes that a step further. How might political actors recon-
cile states and multi-state entities with nations in this new context?
o’brien: Nation-states are not new, but they have been the accepted norm, par-
ticularly in Europe since the nineteenth century. However, at the moment it 
seems that both the state, defined by political borders, and the rather more amor-
phous nation, is far from secure. The fracturing of Britain began pre-Brexit, but 
the fissures have become much more obvious since June 23. Britain was (indeed 
is) composed of, as Benedict Anderson had it, “imagined communities.” It may 
be that the nation is nothing more precise than Thomas Davis’s assertion of it as 
a “spiritual essence.” There was never an agreed version of the nation and until 
recently, beyond some academics, there has been little appetite to dissect what it 
means to be British.
Gillray’s John Bull of the eighteenth century was a rotund, beef-eating plain 
speaker who was suspicious of anything foreign. He was the archetypal Eng-
lishman. The Victorians sanitized the John Bull so beloved of cartoonists and 
satirists of the eighteenth century and recast him in a top hat and tailcoat with 
a union flag on his waistcoat. The beer drinking and the love of food remained 
but the Victorian version is a much more respectable figure. Indeed by the First 
World War, John Bull appeared on recruiting posters. Frank Cottrell Boyce, the 
writer who helped create the opening ceremony for the London Olympics in 
2012 recently reflected that it “painted a portrait of a progressive, inclusive, inno-
vative, funny nation stuffing an astonishing heritage into its backpack as it strode 
into a brilliant future.”5 And that’s exactly what it did. There was pageantry and 
pride and hard work and humor all wrapped up in the values of community and 
diversity. It showed a Britain to be proud of. 
That Britain of 2012 seems a lifetime ago now. Now the nationalism of Brexit 
seems exclusive, inward-looking, divisive and jingoistic. It’s fractured. There 
seems to be multiple versions of the nation (or indeed nations). In part, the shift 
is a feature of globalization which has, to some extent, diluted national identities. 
For over five hundred years since Guttenberg’s first press the dominant form of 
information transfer has been through the printed page. In 1990 the first website 
went live and began a change in how we see the world. There is no longer an 
established truth, no longer any simplified version of nationhood or national-
ity. The ease with which we can get information from around the world, the 
ubiquity of e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,  Snapchat, and any number of 
other instant forms of communication means that people are now creating their 
5. Frank Cottrell Boyce, “What’s the Point of Culture in Brexit Britain?,” Guardian, 15 July 2016.
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own communities, in some respects their own nations. This in part explains why 
so many people were so shocked by the Brexit result: they genuinely hadn’t seen 
it coming. Nothing in their news feed or on their Facebook page indicated that 
“Leave” could win. Facebook (and other sites) filter the suggested posts based 
on what our search history has indicated we want to see. Despite our access to 
more and more information we have become in many ways more insular. Our 
digital world is carefully curated and in that world we can now create our own 
‘imagined communities’ and invent our own traditions.
In another sense, globalization has created new issues that politicians have to 
grapple with. There were valid reasons for voting “Leave.” It wasn’t just a knee-
jerk reaction inspired by the rhetoric of far-right parties. There are communities 
in Britain who have seen their jobs go overseas, while at the same time there 
has been considerable immigration. Assimilation has not always worked and in 
reality multiculturalism is a feature of the metropolitan, middle-class while ar-
eas of Britain (and particularly in England) do genuinely have problems when 
assimilation fails.
How politicians deal with this in the context of Brexit remains to be seen.
white: The question begins with the assertion that we take sovereignty and the 
state as a given, and see recent developments as challenging the inherited status 
quo. Yet, recent International Relations research has challenged that all states 
were fully sovereign in 1648, at the time of the Peace of Westphalia. Sovereignty 
has always been a bit of an abstraction that ignored some of the messy realities 
of national and international politics. 
In the Irish context, was the British state really sovereign over all of Ireland 
after 1648? Even if we assume sovereignty was achieved in the European context, 
how well did it explain the colonial territories that Europe incorporated in the 
nineteenth century? Realist scholars have historically assumed sovereignty, but it 
has always been at best an imperfect way to understand the dynamic of internal 
politics within territories. Most leaders have spent as much time worrying about 
their power in the domestic context as they have in pursuing it in the context of 
other states. 
Historically the great challenge to sovereignty may have been the internal 
social and ethnic divisions within a society that a leader sought to govern, but 
more recently the world has created new opportunities (as well as new chal-
lenges). The benefits of freedom across borders in terms of travel, trade, fi-
nance, and ideas is well understood and accepted. The process of economic 
integration, often called globalization, has integrated the world in ways un-
imaginable in earlier centuries. This has led to useful trade agreements and 
boundless cultural exchange. However, many have become worried in recent 
years that those with skills appreciated by world markets are benefiting from 
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this new global exchange, while those whose skills are not as valued by world 
markets seem to fall behind and are left out of the new high tech and advanced 
consumer economy.
Many who felt this resentment came from families who had relatively high 
wages in earlier eras of manufacturing that were now being left behind in this 
age of outsourcing and automation. As manufacturing is increasingly been 
outsourced to developing economies, a large part of the population in Europe 
and North America is struggling to find its way in the new high-tech economy. 
There have been many studies highlighting how the gap between those who 
succeed in this new economy and those who don’t is far wider than the earlier 
era of industrial production in the West. Both the Brexit vote and the Trump 
victory highlight those who Trump identified in his victory speech as “the for-
gotten.” The critical question for the future is who will control the state—those 
who feel marginalized by recent trends, or those who have benefited? What 
would be most healthy is if policies could be put in place that successfully 
integrate those who feel left behind. The challenge may seem significant at 
present, but compared to the process of moving a peasant population into 
the industrial world this is a much easier task. The unprecedented wealth of 
modern economies provides great opportunity to invest in those who have 
been left behind. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic need to speak to both 
the beneficiaries of the new economy and those who have been left behind. 
Sacrifices and change will be required from both. Sovereignty, and especially 
nationalism, provides the state a great reservoir of human capacity to work 
toward a collective good.
This need not be seen as hostile to cooperation outside of the state. In fact, 
the structural funds that have historically been spent by the European Union 
are a great example of the kind of investment in poorer regions and states that 
undermines resentment and creates appreciation for a political order built on 
principles such as equality, justice, and generosity. It is too easy and simple to 
depict the process of European integration as one of leading to the demise of the 
state and letting unelected EU bureaucrats make policy for states. The coordina-
tion that has come with European policy-making has been an important part 
of the reason for so many improvements in Europe. But this part of the story is 
rarely stressed or explained by politicians or the media. 
The state is likely to survive as the principle means by which we organize 
politics, but the benefits which have come with organizations like the EU will 
continue to incentivize state leaders to promote cooperation across state borders 
even if the benefits of such cooperation are not equally shared in their own society. 
murphy: This is perhaps the most challenging question of all. Tim White’s 
response is illuminating and in my view, it delivers a robust overview of how 
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the concept of sovereignty has never been as pure as Realists might believe or 
suggest. 
Ireland’s sovereignty has long been challenged by its open economy and 
heavy reliance on trade with the rest of the world. Membership of the EU also 
involves a sharing (or ceding) of sovereignty which undermines the autonomy 
of the state. This sharing (or loss) of sovereignty/autonomy was deemed to be 
in the better interests of the state and its people because it promised to deliver 
economic growth and political stability for Ireland and the wider European 
 continent.
From an Irish perspective, the impact of the Belfast Agreement on national 
sovereignty has been more subtle. It facilitates some executive North-South 
decision making on the island of Ireland, but it does not overtly threaten the 
integrity of the British state. Although designed primarily to respond to the 
conflict, the Agreement was achieved against a broader European trend toward 
regionalization. Indeed, the process of devolving powers to the Northern Ireland 
sub-national unit happened in tandem with the asymmetrical devolution of 
powers to both Scotland and Wales. This process of devolving powers involved 
shifting some legislative powers from Westminster to new administrations in 
Edinburgh, Belfast, and Cardiff. Arguably, this contributed to the unleashing 
of forces— particularly in Scotland, which later pushed for an (unsuccessful) 
independence referendum. Today, given the Brexit referendum outcome, the 
rationale for a second independence referendum has been further enlivened. It 
is still too early to say whether such a referendum will happen, and whether it 
might be successful. The terms of the UK exit and the nature of the post-Brexit 
relationship with the EU will have a strong bearing on whether or not Scottish 
independence eventually materializes. In the event that Scotland leaves the UK, 
the British state would clearly be undermined. However, it is important to bear 
in mind that the Scottish independence movement actually aspires to a Scot-
tish state in the traditional sense. The concept of the nation state is, therefore, 
resilient. What is more contested is where the territorial borders of the existing 
British state lies.
jesse: The prominence of the state as the primary actor in the international sys-
tem has been put into question by many competing forces over the past few 
decades, not the least of which are globalization and regionalization. Debates 
rage on what globalization is: When did globalization start? Or does globaliza-
tion even exist? One by-product of these inquiries has been a renewed interest 
in the nation. My mind drifts to Azar Gat’s recent work in Nations: The Long 
History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (2013), in which he 
attempts to establish the long historical foundations of the nation. As he states, 
and I agree, nations existed before states and may very well exist after states are 
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gone. By even contemplating the great length of time that nations have existed 
versus the quite contemporary and shorter period by which the modern state 
has existed (and as Tim so skillfully addressed in his reply as to whether states 
truly have as much sovereignty as normally assumed), Gat challenges the Realist 
assumption of the primacy of the state—both theoretically and practically. 
Now, I am not saying that the modern nation-state is going to evaporate any 
time soon; far from it. But what Brexit and related events have shown us is that 
people still matter, and the nation is the political representation of a “people” or 
“ethnie’ (to use Gat’s terminology). The interests of the state, whether economic 
integration or state security, cannot any longer be presumed to override the in-
terests and demands of the people or nation. Realist theory a la Gilpin (eco-
nomic) or Mearsheimer (security) forces one to think that the state’s interests 
are always of the utmost concern. Yet, Realist theory cannot predict an English 
nation rejecting the economic gains of remaining in the EU. And as I (and oth-
ers, such as Karen Devine) have pointed out elsewhere, it cannot predict an Irish 
nation remaining neutral during the Second World War or the Cold War when 
the Irish state could have easily maximized its security by joining the collective 
security alliances available at the time. 
So at a theoretical understanding, recent events expose the continued mis-
nomer of defining international relations as interstate relations. In some way, the 
question asks what is the outcome of “bringing the nation back in.” Gat would 
have us believe that it has always been there but we as a group of scholars have 
been looking the other way!
At a more practical level, regionalization and the renewed emphasis on re-
gional national interests versus that of state interests, and thus the interests of 
a people or ethnie, creates a space opened by globalization by which political 
actors can seek autonomy from multi-state bodies (e.g., Brexit), semi-autonomy 
from a centralized state (e.g., devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ire-
land or autonomous communities in Spain), or the representation or inclusion 
of national/community interests (e.g., in policy-making and governance as in 
the Good Friday Agreement) under a state through direct national appeals. Na-
tions have always made appeals for sovereignty. That part is not new. What is 
new is that the global environment has challenged states to such a degree that 
there is more room for national forces to maneuver.
murphy: We might say that the Brexit debate revealed a belief among voters that 
a return to traditional governance arrangements, where the national government 
dominates, is a better route to prosperity and security, and one which protects 
against the negative forces of globalization. There is a certain irony, therefore, in 
the fact that those who voted for Brexit were focused on “taking back control” or 
reclaiming national sovereignty—when the impact of that vote may prove to be 
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the territorial disintegration of that older nation-state order. Such a move may 
be accompanied not just by alterations to the shape of the traditional British 
state, but also by a decline in its economic fortunes and a lowering of its place 
within the global world order.
In Ireland, the suggestion that Brexit provides a strong rationale for Irish 
unification has been disputed by all but Sinn Féin. There is no strong and irrefut-
able appetite for Irish unity right now. Of course, this may change, and again, the 
terms of the UK exit from the EU will be significant here. Should the exit from 
the EU prove detrimental to Northern Ireland interests, support for Irish unifi-
cation may evolve. In the event of a united Ireland becoming a reality, however, 
the end result will be a (nation-)state, as per the traditional formula, but with 
new territorial borders. The same attachment to a model of governance based on 
traditional nation-state structures is apparent here too. 
For all its flaws and failings, the nation-state remains a unit of political or-
ganization which commands widespread support. The UK has opted to return 
to that traditional version of British rule—although in doing so, it may in fact 
undermine the borders of the British state and challenge its place in the global 
order. Perhaps the lesson is, Be careful what you wish for . . .
jesse: The impact of renewed national appeals and space for nationalist move-
ments on the Irish nation and Irish nationalism is not easy to ascertain. While 
one may jump to the conclusion that unification of the Irish population in 
Northern Ireland with the Republic would be a natural or logical (are either of 
these words even correct, when used to describe an aggregation of individuals?) 
response, the reality is much more complicated and subtle. Nations may not be 
as monolithic or cyclopean as presumed . . . and nations divided by state borders 
might have quite different interests precisely because of the different states. Do 
Germans in Austria have the same national interests as Germans in Germany or 
the Czech Republic or Italy? Clearly not. While Sinn Féin makes the assumption 
that the interests of the Irish nation North and South are similar, this is not likely 
to be accurate. The Irish in the Republic have to consider their Irish state interest 
as well as their national interest—Sinn Féin does not, as it discounts the British 
state’s interest as being opposed to the Irish nation’s interest (I am generalizing 
to make the point more clear).
The impact on the Irish nation’s relationship with the multi-state European 
Union is even murkier. As Mary Murphy, points out, the EU has long recognized 
regional nations and their separate interests from the state in which they exist, 
while at the same time not encouraging regionalization. That the Irish in the 
North and South benefit from EU membership is without serious objection. 
That Irish in the North might be more marginalized in a post-Brexit United 
Kingdom seems like a reasonable conclusion, too.
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mcmahon: Part of the problem with answering such questions is that we are 
confronting different definitions of nations, states, and nation-states. Another 
part is that it is incredibly difficult to predict anything when so many variables—
including the type of Brexit that will occur—remain uncertain. 
Unlike Neal Jesse, however, I am not persuaded by scholars, such as Gat 
or Anthony Smith, who see nations as old (if not primordial) entities. To be 
sure, the word “nation” or some variant on it has been in use for a very long 
time, but it did not imply all of the people of a particular group or territory 
in the same way that it did from the late-1700s. More in keeping with Benedict 
Anderson, and Miroslav Hroch, and with Gillian O’Brien in this conversation, 
I see myself as a modernist; that is, as someone who sees nations as modern 
creations. That said, Hroch has argued persuasively—and Smith has moved to 
this position in some of his more recent ruminations on the emergence of na-
tions from ethnies—that those modern creations do not emerge out of whole 
cloth, but were built on remnants, cultural legacies, traditions, etc. (Smith still 
wouldn’t go as far as Eric Hobsbawm and talk about invented traditions play-
ing a role in this, though I see considerable value in such concepts helping 
us to understand expressions of national identity incorporating the old and 
the new.) 
I would go a step further and adapt Tim White’s important earlier comment 
on state sovereignty as an uncertain phenomenon and apply it to nations. In 
spite of the rhetoric of those who see nations as fixed, they are continually be-
ing redefined. And one factor involved in defining them in the modern period 
was the state, which White correctly points out was itself in development. Few 
observations confirm this multivalent conundrum more than the statement by 
the Piedmontese parliamentarian Massimo d’Azeglio, who wrote in his memoirs 
after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, “We have made Italy. Now we must 
make Italians.”
The question here, however, asks us to consider a twentieth-century percep-
tion, that is, that decision-makers and members of most publics in the West 
viewed the concept of the nation-state as a given. I am not saying that it was or 
should have been; indeed, the preceding discussion has highlighted numerous 
ways in which the reality in states gave the lie to the notion that nation-states 
were normative. That said, the forces that O’Brien mentioned earlier culmi-
nated in the Wilsonian moment at the end of the First World War when Great 
Power leaders drew up state boundaries to assuage the claims of “national” 
spokespersons to statehood. We know, of course, that their efforts were flawed, 
at times explosively so. Still, while most people can well appreciate that the 
borders of independent states in Africa and Asia were often drawn artificially 
by European imperialists, incorporating numerous ethnic or national groups 
in a single state, it often takes recognition of minority nations within states by 
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supranational entities like the EU to call our attention to the same phenom-
enon in Europe. 
That’s precisely why the Irish-British nexus is interesting on multiple levels. 
The border drawn at the time of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 under-
cut a single-state solution by arguing that there were two nations on the island, 
one of which formed the majority in Northern Ireland and one an even larger 
majority in Southern Ireland (reconstituted later as the Irish Free State and 
eventually the Republic of Ireland). For many self-described Irish nationalists, 
the two-nations idea was and remains anathema, but for Unionists, it became 
an article of faith that they were British. The Belfast Agreement in 1998 of-
fered the prospect that people could claim membership/citizenship in both the 
British and Irish states. In essence, such a prospect cut the “state leg” out from 
under the supposed nation-state stance that had hardened over nearly eight 
decades. It also came at a time when the United Kingdom was opening itself up 
to limited Scottish and Welsh devolution, a constitutional change that had roots 
in Labour’s willingness to appease elements of its electoral base and in their 
growing recognition that these two elements of the complex British entity had 
justifiable claims to nationhood, just not as fully independent nation-states. In 
the long run, as Mary Murphy points out, that modest change provided space 
and institutions that enabled the advocates of Scottish independence to develop 
their case more fully. 
Interestingly, their calls—potentially aided yet again by the Brexit vote—
could call for further examination of the two-nations in Northern Ireland, since 
the Britishness of the North has frequently been refracted through ties to Scot-
land. The reality, of course, is that the United Kingdom has always been a multi-
national state. If the Brexit deal ultimately leads the Scots to call for a full break 
from that entity, I wonder how and whether the Britishness of the North would 
reconstitute itself. 
jesse: We have to ask, what can we assume with any high degree of confidence 
about nation and state relations for the Irish? Could the Northern Irish make 
appeals to the EU through the larger Irish nation? Would the government of the 
Republic want to help such appeals? Would the Southern Irish people desire to 
make appeals on behalf of their northern brethren? Or does that border drawn 
by states become like a new Berlin Wall and the Irish nation really becomes two 
separate nations of Irish people? And would the EU even care about the North-
ern Irish left behind by Brexit? Or more precisely, what member states/political 
actors/nations of the EU might care, and which might not? In other words, to 
whom might the Northern Irish appeal in the EU? Would a renewed nationalist 
movement in Northern Ireland return to more direct demands for autonomy/
independence aimed at the British government? Would they return to violence 
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as a means to an end? And to what end if the Irish to the south do not want 
unification? Is the end goal a South Sudan carved out of Northern Ireland for 
the Irish population there, much like Scotland wants to carve itself out of a post-
Brexit UK? Could the end be the creation of more states?
The crystal ball that I am looking into only shows me indecipherable swirls.
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